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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

TRADE COMMISSION OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
UTAH RETAIL GROCERS ASSOCIATION and George Ingalls, d/b/a
George's Market,
Plaintiffs in Intervention and Respondents,

No. 7783

vs.
JAMES L. BUSH, d/b/a BUSH SUPER
MARKET,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
An acton was brought by the Trade Commission of Utah
against James L. Bush, d/b/a Bush Super Market in Ogden,
Utah for violating the Unfair Practices Act of the State of
Utah. It was the contention of the plaintiffs that the defendant
violated the Unfair Practices Act and more particularly Section 16A-4-7, as amended by Chapter 21, Laws of 1951, by
~
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selling merchandise below cost, as that term is defined in the
statute, by issuing S & H green stamps with the sale of merchandise marked up no more than the minimum prescribed by
the statute. The facts in the case are not disputed. It is agreed
that the defendant sold many items which will hereafter be
referred to as 67o items on which the markup was the bare
statutory minimum of 670 . The defendant does not deny doing
the acts complained of but maintains that such acts do not constitute a violation of the statute.
The evidence was heard by the trial court and after oral
argument and written memoranda had been considered by the
court, judgment was rendered against the defendant for having
violated the statute and an injunction was issued restraining
the defendant from continuing the unlawful practices. Defendant thereafter prosecuted this appeal.
The particular facts of the case will be more thoroughly
discussed in connection with the points.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
I. THE ISSUANCE OF CASH DISCOUNT STAMPS
IS NOT COMPARABLE TO THE COST OF ADVERTISING,
THE COST OF CARRYING CHARGE ACCOUNTS, THE
COST OF MAKING DELIVERIES, ETC.

II. THE GIVING OF A TRADING STAMP IS IN EFFECT A CASH DISCOUNT WHICH REDUCES THE PURCHASE PRICE OF THE ARTICLE PURCHASED.

4
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III. THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES A DEFINITE
INTENT ON THE PART OF THE DEFENDANT TO
INJURE COMPETITORS.
IV. THE UNFAIR PRACTICES ACT IS CONSTITUTIONAL.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE ISSUANCE OF CASH DISCOUNT STAMPS IS
NOT COMPARABLE TO THE COST OF ADVERTISING,
THE COST OF CARRYING CHARGE ACCOUNTS, THE
COST OF MAKING DELIVERIES, ETC.
Appellant devotes pages 12 to 29 of his brief to the
proposition that the issuance of cash discount stamps is comparable to the cost of advertising, the cost of carrying charge
accounts, the cost of making deliveries, etc., and that the
giving of such stamps constitutes a cash discount. With the
later position respondents are in agreement.
The argument that the issuance of cash discount stamps
is comparable to the cost of advertising, the cost of carrying
credit and the cost of other functions performed by some retail
grocers has been rejected by various courts which have considered the matter. The question was thoroughly considered
by the Court of Appeals of the State of New York in the
case of Bristol-Meyers Co. v. Picker, et al, 302 New York 61,
96 NE 2d 177. In that case the New York Court said:
5
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Considered as a method of advertising, the challenged scheme must be differentiated from types of service
such as free parking, self-service, care of infants, entertainment, free delivery and the like, with which we are
not presently concerned. These other types of service
have no direct relation to the article purchased or the
price paid. They are completely separated and too remote from the pricing element to come within the
statute's prohibition. Here the benefit to the customer
is directly, proportionately, inseparably and specifically
related to the article purchased and its price. (Emphasis
added.)
The vast distinction between the giving of trading stamps
and mere advertising was also considered by the Supreme
Court of the United Stats in the case of Rast v. Van Deman
& Lewis Co., 240 U.S. 342, 36 S. Ct. 370, 60 L.Ed. 679, wherein
the court said:
It would be an endless task to cite cases in demonstration, and that the supplementing of the sale of
one article by a token given and to be redeemed in some
other article has accompaniments and effects beyond
mere advertising the allegations of the bill and the
argument of counsel establish. Advertising is merely
identification and description, apprising of quality and
place. It has no other object than to draw attention to
the article to be sold, and the acquisition of the article
to be sold constitutes the only inducement to its purchase. The matter is simple, single in purpose and
motive; its consequences are well defined, there being
nothing ulterior; it is the practice of old and familiar
transactions and has sufficed for their success.

The schemes of complainants have no such directness and· effect. They rely upon something else than
the article sold. They tempt by a promise of a value
6
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greater than that article and apparently not represented in its price, and it hence may be thought that thus
by an appeal to cupidity lure to improvidence.
See also Tanner v. Little, 240 U.S. 369, 36 S. Ct. 379, 60 LEd
691.

POINT II
THE GIVING OF A TRADING STAMP IS IN EFFECT
A CASH DISCOUNT WHCH REDUCES THE PURCHASE
PRICE OF THE ARTICLE PURCHASED.
Appellant concedes that the effect of g1vmg a trading
stamp is to grant a cash discount to the purchaser but then
paradoxically maintains that such discount does not affect
a reduction in the price of the article. The evidence in this
case shows that with each article purchased appellant gave
an S & H green stamp for each lOc represented in the purchase price which was redeemable either in merchandise or
cash. If redeemed in merchandise it represented a discount
on the article purchased of slightlr more than 2lfo. If redeemed
in cash it represented a discount of slightly less than 2<fo.
The net effect was no different than if appellant had handed
back in cash or reduced the selling price of the article by an
amount equal to the redeemable value of the stamp. If a cash
discount (effectuated by the giving of a trading stamp) does
not result in a lowered price on the article purchased then a
discount ach1ally given in cash would not result in a lowered
price. Under appellant's argument the cash discounts, which
the evidence shows were offered by Simpson's Market, Safeway
7
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and American Food Stores in the amount of Yfo, would be
perfectly legal. If appellant's position is correct it would
follow that if another grocery store were to give a cash discount of 6Cf0 , that also would be legal. The provision of the
Unfair Practices Act prohibiting sales below cost then would
be completely nullified. A grocer could mark up an item
enough to comply with the statute, then completely nullify it
by lowering the price of the article again by means of a cash
discount. It is a primary rule of statutory construction that
courts will construe statutes to have some meaning. If the
construction contended for by appellant were adopted by the
Court, the prohibition against sales below cost would be absolutely meaningless. Merely by adopting the device of a cash
discount any merchant that desired to do so could completely
circumvent the enitre effect of the statute. This contention
was dealt with by the Court of Appeals of New York in the
Picker case cited above. The Picker case was concerned not
with an Unfair Trades Practices Act but with a Fair Trades
Practices Act. While the Picker case was concerned with "fair
trade prices" rather than "sales below cost," it is in point
so far as the basic principles are concerned. In the Picker
case, rather than to give coupons, various merchants in the
town had teamed together in a pool and had given their customers the receipts from their cash registers. The customers
would take the receipts and treat them just as S & H green
stamps are treated. When a customer had secured a sufficient
number of the receipts he could redeem them at a central
office either for cash or for merchandise. The situation was
analgous to the case here under consideration.

8
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In discussing the nature of the cash discount afforded by
the receipt system, the New York Court stated:
"Assuming that there is no essential difference between the use of trading stamps and cash register receipts which are redeemable, and that either may be
regarded as a form of cash discount, I nevertheless
cannot agree with the opinion in the cases cited that
such a discount does not cut the sale price of an article.
No matter how one puts it, the consumer who is accorded a cash discount in reality pays that much less for
the article which he purchases, and this is none the less
true because the return is by way of merchandise
rather than coin which may purchase merchandise.
When defendants sold plaintiff's products at fair trade
prices, and as a part of the same transaction gave
their ·customers cash register receipts having a redemtion value of 21f27o of such fair trade prices, they, in
effect, sold plaintiff's products at 2lf27o less than the
prices fixed. I can s_ee no distinction between returning
to the customer a credit memorandum of 21f27o and
giving him a cash register receipt. And whether the
discount is small or large makes no difference-the
statute forbids both."
This same matter was also considered by the Supreme
Court of the State of Wisconsin in the case of Ed Schuster &
Co. v. Steffes, 23·7 Wis. 41, 295 NW 737, 133 ALR 1071.
There the Wisconsin Court stated;
"The contention that trading stamps are merely a
species of cash discount has substance and perhaps is
true. It does not follow, however, that so considered th~
issuance of stamps does not effect a reduction of the
stipulated resale price, and the fact is that it does result
in such a reduction. This is obvious in all cash transactions and only slightly less so than in those involving

9
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credit. Hence, we conclude that the trial court erred in
holding that to the extent of a two per cent discount
trading stamps do not operate to reduce the resale price
and are not within the prohibition of the subsection."
It is true that there are two cases decided under the Fair
Trade Act which hold that the giving of a trading stamp or
a cash discount coupon does not .r.esult in lowermg the fixed
price under the interpretation of the Fair Trade Act. Those
cases as cited by appellant in his brief are Bristol-Meyers v.
Lit Bros., Inc., 336 Pa. 81, 6 A.2d 843 and Weco Products v.
Mid-City Cut Rate Drug Stores, 55 Cal. App. 2d 684, 131 P.
2d 856. However, those decisions were reached on the basis,
as stated in the Picker case that, "the allowance of such discount has not injured the good will value of any article of
plaintiff's merchandise." The difference in effect of giving a
cash discount with articles protected by the Fair Trade Act
and with articles protected by the Unfair PFactices Act is
clear. Generally, the purpose of the Fair Trade Act is to insure
the manufacturers of brand name articles that the reputation
of their products will not be jeopardized by being sold in some
stores at lower prices than those established by the manufacturers and likewise to insure that the public will be able
to buy a brand name article at a given price throughout
the country. Both the California and Pennsylvania cases were
brought by the manufacturers on the grounds that by giving
the trading stamps with the purchase of the brand name article,
the reputation of the particular brand was being jeopardized
in the public mind and that the public would come to regard
the brand name in question as a cheaper article or an article
of inferior quality. The rationale of the courts is obvious. So
10
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long as a certain stated l?osted price was maintained by the
merchants on the particular articles being sold, this would
be the price which the public would regard as tlie established
price by the manufacturer and purchasers would clearly understand that any reduction that they got from that established
price did not represent a concession made by the manufacturer
but was purely an arrangement between them and their local
merchant. As is pointed out in the Picker case, this reasoning
is rather tenuous even in regard to the Fair Trade Act, and
of course would have no bearing as applied to the Unfair
Practices Act. While it may be argued as is done in the California and the Pennsylvania cases, that the giving of trading
stamps does not effect a violation of the spirit and intent of the
Fair Trades Act, it is quite clear that the giving of trading
stamps as pointed out above completely nullifies the Unfair
Trade Practices Act.
The use of trading stamps was challenged under the
Unfair Practices Act in the California case of Food and
Grocery Bureau, Inc. v. Garfield, 20 Cal. 2d 228, 125 P. 2d
3 supra. There plaintiff did not charge that there was any
sale below cost but contended rather that the giving of the
stamps was, in effect, the giving of a commodity in violation
of a section of the Unfair Practices Act. The defendant has
quoted this case in his brief to the effect that the trading
stamp was not a commodity but was a cash discount. However, we direct the court's attention to language in the decision where the California court states that had the action been
brought under the below cost section of the statute and had
the evidence been proper, an injunction would have been
granted. The California court said:
11
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"Concededly, the Unfair Practices Act, supra, makes
no reference to trading stamps. To support the respondent's position, therefore, it is necessary for him
to show either that the plan conducted by the appellant
amounts to the giving away of a product for the purpose of injuring competitors or destroying competition,
or that by its use he sells products below cost. But the
association does not assert that the appellant's issuance
of trading stamps resulted in the sale of any commodities below cost, and the affidavits filed by it do
not include any facts indicating that sales below cost
were accomplished by the use of stamps." (Emphasis
added.)
While the above language of the court is dicta it certainly indicates that the California Court felt that had the
action been brought under the proper section of the act and
had it appeared from the evidence that the giving of the
stamps reduced the price blow the required 67o markup, a
violation of the statute would have been proved.
Appellant takes the position that the holding of the California court in the Garfield case is altered by the holding in
the Weco case cited above. However, as pointed out above,
this is not so for the reason that the Weco case concerns itself
with the Fair Trades Practices Act whereas the Garfield case
concerns itself with the Unfair Practices Act just as does the
case now before the Court and the two Acts have an entirely
different purpose and view.
In the case of Sunbeam Corporation v. Klein, 79 A.2d
603, the Supreme Court of Delaware held that the defendant
violated the Fair Trade Act by issuing trading stamps with the
sale of fair trade items thus reducing the price of those items.
The Court said:
12
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"It is true that the giving of trading stamps and
cash register receipts redeemable either in _merchandise
or cash by purchasers have been held to be price cutting
within the meaning of the Fair Trade Acts and, as
such, en joinable. Schuster & Co. v. Steffes, 23 7 Wis.
41, 295 NW 7?,7, 133 A.L.R. 1071; Bristol-Meyers
Co. v. Picker, 302 N.Y. 61, 96 N.E. 2d 177. But, other
services furnished by a retailer to attract customers to
his business such as the furnishing of parking facilities,
baby sitting, delivery service and the extension of credit,
are not held to be price cutting within the meaning of
- Fair Trade Acts. Bristol-Meyers Co. v. Lit Bros., Inc.,
336 Pa. 81, 6 A.2d 843 Weco Products Co. v. MidCity Cut-Rate Drug Stores, 55 Cal. App. 2d 684, 131
P.2d 856."
In the Oregon case of Lambert Pharmacal Company v.
Roberts Bros., 233 P. 2d 258, the right of a merchant to give
trading stamps with a fair traded item was challenged. After
the case was originally argued, the Supreme Court of the United
States in the case of Schwegmann Brothers v. Calvert Distillers
Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 71 S. Ct. 745, 95 L.Ed. 1035, decided
that the Miller-Tydings Amendment to the Sherman AntiTrust Act, which in general excepted state fair trade laws
and unfair trade practice acts from the prohibitions of the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act, was not sufficiently broad to extend
this exemption to a non-signer of a fair trade agreement. In
view of the fact that a non-signer was involved in the Oregon
case, the Supreme Court of Oregon aJoked that the problem
be reargued and after reargument held that in view of the
fact that a non-signer was involved, the Schwegmann case
prevented it from upholding the Fair Trade Act of Oregon
as to a non-signer. However, the very fact tha.t the Court
asked for a reargument of the case intimates that had it not
13
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been for the Schwegmann case the court would have held that
the giving of the trading stamps effectuated a reduction of
the price of the article. Otherwise there would have been no
reason for asking for the reargument. As pointed out above,
there is much greater reason for prohibiting the use of trading
stamps to effectuate price cutting under the Unfair Practices
Act than there is under the Fair Trade Act.
The argument of defendant that even if a reduction in
price below the statutory minimum was effected by the giving
of· trading stamps, the reduction is so small that the rule of
de minimus should apply is rather novel in view of the testimony of the defendant himself. While the cash discount
effected by the giving of the trading stamps amounts to 2.08<_f0
so far as the customer is concerned, it should be remembered
that the mark-up on these articles under which the complaint
is made was only 6lfo. Therefore, the reduction of 2.08<,fo
means that the margin of the retailer, upon which he has to
do business, was reduced more than one-third. Certainly such
a reduction does not come under the de minimum rule. Furthermore, regardless of how small the value may be to the
consumer of a single trading stamp or a group of trading
stamps, it is evident that the trading stamps are effecting a
definite injury to competitors. If they are not, and if they
are not drawing additional business to the retailer that uses
them then obviously the claims of the S & H Green Stamp
Company that they stimulate business are not well founded.
The defendant himself testified that since using the stamps
he had drawn new business, not only from his immediate
neighborhood, but from all over the city, that his business had
increased substantially and that he felt that the existence of
14
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the S & H Green Stamp Plan in his store contributed in a
material way to this increased business, which of course, was
drawn from his competitors. How then can it be argued that
the rule of de minimum should apply? De minim us applies
only when the matter under consideration is so small as to
have no practical effect. Here, as we· have seen, the matter
under consideration represents more than 1/3 of the retailer's
total mark-up and has effectuated a substantial increase in
the business of the retailer using the trading stamps. As the
Supreme Court of the State of New York in the Picker case
above cited stated:
"I can· see no distinction between returning to the
customer a credit memorandum of 2V27o and giving
him a cash register receipt. And whether the· discount
is small or large makes no difference--the statute forbids both.
"Defendants her~ agree that if the customer purchased $10.00 worth of plaintiff's products, he would
immediately receive on request and for nothing, any
fair traded article he desired and which was priced at
25c. If a retailer may allow 2V:27o under the statute,
a competitor may follow the same plan but instead
allow 570 , in biting retaliation with an even greater
allowance. Where may it end? The same cut-throat
competition sought to be avoided by the Fair Trade
Law could thus be revised under the so-called cash
discount system."
The appellants maintain that even if the giving of the
stamps does result in a price reduction, they would not be
guilty of a violation of the law under the facts complained of.
They maintain that Section 16A-4-9, Utah Code Annotated,
1943 requires that where there is a combination purchase

15
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of 6lfo items with other items having a much higher mark-up,
the law is not violated unless the sales price of all the items
taken collectively is below the collective cost of the items. Even
if it be conceded that Section 16A-4-9 is ambiguous on its
face, however, when read in light of the purpose of the entire
Unfair Practices Act, its meaning becomes quite clear. Obviously no retailer is going to be able to sell all of his products
below cost and still stay in business. If he sells some items
below cost, whether it be by means of a trading stamp, an
out and out cash discount or merely a loss-leader, if he is
going to make a profit on his whole operation it is necessary
that he mark some items up more than enough to represent
a fair return on such items. This is the very practice at
which the statute is aimed. The statute is designed to
prevent retailers from giving the customer an apparent
saving on certain items in order to lure him into the
store where it is hoped that the customer will purchase
other items on which the markup is out of line. The
section mentioned obviously means that each item or every
item in the purchase must bear its own share of the cost of
doing business and not that the collective profit on all the
items should be enough to cover the cost of doing business.
The natural law of economics will take care of that matter
and no statute would be required.
Appellant takes the position that because Section 16A-4-7,
subsection 2, provides that in figuring his costs the grocer is
not allowed to deduct cash discounts, it follows as a matter
of logic that cash discounts should not be construed as reducing the purchase price paid by the ultimate consumer
to the grocer. We are unable to follow the logic of the appel16
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lant' s pos1t1on m this regard. The Legislature has seen fit
to make a specific exception in the case of cost to the wholesaler and cost to the retailer. If, as a matter of sound logic,
cash discounts would not reduce the purchase price, why,
then, would a specific statutory provision be required ? The
rule of expressio unius, exclusio alterius would seem to apply
in this case. The Legislature has chosen to except from the
ordinary logical meaning of the term "cash discount," its
application to the purchase price of the wholesaler and
the retailer. It has not seen fit to make such a specific exception as to the purchase price of the ultimate consumer.
The only conclusion to be drawn from this, therefore, is that
the Legislature intended that the ordinary commonly accepted
rules of construction should apply. Furthermore, to provide
that cash discounts shall not be construed as reducing the price
of goods to the wholesaler and the retailer does not strike
at the very foundation of the Act, whereas if a similar provision were made in regard to the price paid by the ultimate
consumer, as has been pointed out above, the entire Act
prohibiting sales below cost would be rendered inoperative.

POINT III
THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES A DEFINITE INTENT
ON THE PART OF THE DEFENDANT TO INJURE
COMPETITORS.
The Utah Unfair Practices Act provides that the acts, in
order to be in violation, must be done with the intent or the
effect of injuring competitors. Later in the discussion of the
17
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constitutional issues, we will discuss more fully the question
of the constitutionality of a statute so providing and also the
question of whether a state may constitutionally prohibit acts
which have the effect of injuring competitors where no intent
is shown.
It appears quite clear, however, from the evidence in
the case that the plaintiffs have established both the effect and
the intent. Numerous grocer witnesses called by the plaintiffs
testified that in their opinion the issuance of stamps by the
defendant had taken business from other business establishments in the nieghborhood. The witness W angsguard testified
as to how his business had fallen off since the stamps were
issued and testified that in his opinion the direct cause of
his business falling off was the issuance of the stamps by the
defendant. The witness Van W aggonen testified that his
· business had fallen off so much that its very existence was
threatened. He further testified that he had seen customers
who had formerly traded at his store going to the Bush Market.
He further testified that many of his customers had asked
him to put in the trading stamp system and complained because
he did not do so. He further testified that in his opinion the
issuance of the stamps by the defendant was responsible
for the reduction in his business.
Other witnesses representing the larger grocery stores
throughout Ogden testified that the disastrous price war in
the city of Ogden was traceable directly to the issuance of
trading stamps at the Bush Markets. Bush himself, both in
his deposition and during his examination on the stand, testified that his business had been materially increased since the
18
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issuance of these trading stamps, and further that in his opinion
the stamps were a material factor in his business increas~.
Therefore the effect of injury to competitors is well established.
Obviously one type of injury to competitors which the Legislature intended to prohibit by the passage of the Unfair Practices Act, in addition to protecting the public was the taking
of a competitor's business by unfair means. If business is
taken away by a competitor by fair methods of competition,
that is legal and, of course, in keeping with the American
tradition of free enterprise. However, the Legislature determined that certain methods of taking a competitor's business
were unfair and unhealthy to business as a whole and prohibited them. One of the unfair methods prohibited was the
practice of price cutting as defined in the statute. The sole
question of intent, therefore, is not whether the defendant
intended to violate the law, but merely whether the method
which h adopted, leaving aside for the moment the question
of whether or not it is legal, was adopted by him with the
intent of attracting customers from other stores.
Intent, of course, is something which must almost always
be proved by circumstantial evidence. It is seldom if ever
that a person will admit on the witness stand, or even admit
before witnesses, that he intended to violate the law, that he
intended to drive his competitors out of business or even that
he intended to injure his competitors. In order to arrive at
the intent of an individual the court must look at what the
individual did, what the result was, and at the facts surrounding the situation in an effort to determine what, in the light
of common knowledge, was probably the intent of the individual in doing the act complained of. Here the evidence is

19
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clear that the defendant did reduce his prices by means of
giving trading stamps and that the result of this reduction in
prices was that he injured his competitors by taking -their
business away from them. It is a fundamental rule of law
that individuals are presumed to intend the natural and probable consequence of acts performed by them. The question
of intent to injure competitors by price cutting was carefully
considered by the Supreme Court of California in the case of
People v. Pay Less Drug Stores, et al, 143 P2d 762. California
has a statute providing that evidence of the sale below cost
is presumptive evidence of a violation of the law. The Supreme
Court of California in the case above cited determined that
this statutory presumption was invalid and unconstitutional
because of the fact that there were certain classifications of
sales exempted from the act and there was no logical assumption merely because the sales were made that they did not
fall within one of the exemptions provided in the statute.
However, after invalidating the statutory presumption, the
court went on to hold that the fact that the defendant had
intentionally cut prices which had resulted in injuring competitors was presumptive evidence that there was an intent
to injure competitors even though there was no presumption
that the sales were not within one of the exempted classes.
In discussing this question the Supreme Court of California
said:
"So far as the first question is concerned, the respondent produced as the first witness the secretary of the
Retail Grocers Association of Alameda County. He
testified that appellants attract customers of their
competitors by selling at cost or below, and that the
natural effect of selling below cost by one merchant
20
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is to lessen the business of his competitors. Various
grocery store operators then testified that they were
competitors of appellants. Several of those operated
stores reasonably close to that of appellants, one operated a store in Piedmont, and the others operated stores
several miles distant. They all testified that during
the early months of 1940 they noticed a material decline in their volume of business that was not purely
seasonal. Several of them testified that during this
period they noticed a particular decline in the volume
of their coffee sales, that being one of the products
appellants admittedly sold below cost during this
period. Several testified that in self-defense they had
to reduce their price to meet the challenge of appellants. Appellants argued that evidence of loss of volume
is not necessarily evidence of "injury" to competitors
because to constitute an in jury there must be a loss of
profits, and loss of volume does not necessarily show
loss of profits. There is ample evidence in the record
of the highly competitive nature of the retail grocery
business, and of the small margin of profit that exists
because of such competition. In view of that evidence,
it is a reasonable, if not inevitable, inference that loss
of volume of business shows loss of profits.
On this evidence the trial court found that these
sales below cost were with the intent to injure competitors or to destroy competition. It is, of course,
true that all sales below cost are not prohibited. Only
those sales accompanied by the requisite intent are
prohibited. This was the express holding in Wholesale
T. Dealers v. National, etc., Co., 11 Cal. 2d 634, at
page 658, 82 P2d at page 17, 118 A.L.R. 486. See
also, Balzar v. Coler, 11 Cal. 2d 633, 82 P2d 19. In~ent,
however, is not something that can alwzays be proved
by concrete evidence. It is an intangible matter that
may be proved by inferences based on reasonable
probabilities. Without now considering the evidence

21
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produced by appellants, and without regard to the
presumption contained in paragraph 5 above quoted,
we think that it is a reasonable inference from the above
evidence that the sales here involved were with the
requisite intent. The sales below cost are admitted.
The evidence shows competitors were injured by such
price cutting by appellants. In addition, the act permits sales below cost, but the respondent, proved that
these sales did not fall within any of the permitted
categories. This is a necessary part of the respondent's
burden of proof. Green v. Grimes-Stassforth S. Co.
39 Cal. App. 2d 52, 102 P2d 452. It seems to us that
when sales below cost are shown, when injury to competitors appears, and when the evidence shows the
sales were not in any of the permitted classes, the
trier of the fact may reasonably infer, as was done in
this case, that such sales were of the prohibited class,
that is, sales below cost for the purpose or with the
intent to injure competitors or to destroy competition.
In the case now before the court, as in the case above
cited, the fact of price cutting has been proved. The injury
to competitors has been proved. It his been stipulated by the
parties that the acts complained of did not fall within any
of the statutory exemptions except possibly subsection (d)
relating to the reduction of prices to meet competition. The
defendant introduced no evidence to indicate that the price
cutting was to meet competition and on this he had the burden
of proof. Plaintiff, however, went ahead and assumed the
burden of affirmatively proving that there was no pricecutting which might have caused defendant to reduce his
prices to meet competition in the Ogden area in the period
preceding the issuance of the trading stamps by the defendant.
Therefore, with the statutory exemptions negatived, the only
22
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question left is the question of intent. As is stated in the
quotation above by the California court this intent can be
presumed. However, we need not rely on this presumption.
During the cross-examination of the defendant on the stand,
he admitted, somewhat reluctantly, that his_ purpose in giving
S & H green stamps was to attract new business for his store;
that it was immaterial where the business came from; that
if it was business that formerly belonged to a competitor that
was quite all right. As is pointed out above, while it was
legitimate for him to attract new customers by fair methods
of competition, the Unlawful Practices Act of Utah prohibits
the attracting of such customers by means which have been
declared unfair by the Legislature.

POINT IV
THE UNFAIR PRACTICES ACT IS CONSTITUTIONAL.
Appellant attacks the constitutionality of the Unfair
Practices Act on the ground that it purportedly violates the
"equal protection" and "due process" clauses of the Federal
Constitution and the corresponding sections of the State Constitution.
It is alleged that the statute discriminates between the
"credit and delivery" and the "cash and carry" merchant. The
alleged discrimination, however, is based on appellant's
erroneous assumption that the statutory markup is intended
to cover all of the costs of the one but only some of the costs
of the other. A complete and decisive answer to this attack
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on the constitutionality of the statute is a reading of the
statute itself where "cost" is defined as including, among other
elements, a markup of six per cent to cover a proportionate
part of the cost of doing business in the absence of proof
of a lesser cost. There is nothing in the statute which either
expressly or inferentially provides that the statutory markup
is to be applied differently in the case of a "credit and delivery" or a "cash and carry" merchant. Section 16A-4-7 (b) 3·,
Utah Code Annotated, 1943, as amended by Chapter 21,
Laws of 1951, provides in part as follows:
When used in this act, the term "cost to the retailer"
shall mean the invoice cost of the merchandise to the
retailer within thirty days prior to the date of sale,
or the date of offering for sale, or the replacement
cost of the merchandise to the retailer, whichever is
lower less all trade discounts except customary discounts for cash; to which shall be added * * * (c) a
markup to cover a proportionate part of the cost of
doing busines, which markup, in the absence of proof
of a lesser cost, shall be six per cent * * * * .
Appellant's erroneous assumption that the statute contemplates a different application of the statutory markup in the
case of the two types of merchants interjects a discriminatory
element into the case which does not in fact exist.
As a corollary to the foregoing, appellant asserts that the
overhead of the "cash and carry" merchant is lower than the
overhead of the "credit and delivery" merchant and that consequently the "cash and carry" merchant should be permitted
to charge correspondingly lower prices. Assuming, arguendo,
that appellant's assumption is correct, it would follow that
24
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the "cash and carry .. merchant could charge lower prices than
the "credit and delivery" merchant providing that both merchants priced their merchandise at actual rather than statutory
cost. It does not follow, however, that the "cash and carry"
merchant or the "credit and delivery" merchant may price
his merchandise on the basis of the statutory markup and then
deduct therefrom a particular item of expense merely because
he does not and the other type of merchant does incur that
item of expense as a part of his cost of doing business. Under
the statute, a merchant may sell his merchandise either at
actual cost, which necessarily includes all costs of doing business, or at stautory cost, which, by its very definition, includes
only a proportionate part of the cost of doing business. In
other words either the "cash and carry" or the "credit and
delivery" merchant may sell at actual or statutory cost but
neither may price his merchandise at statutory cost and then
deduct from the selling price an item of expense in the cost
of doing business which he does not bear but which is borne
by the other type of merchant.
Appellant cites Florida Dry Cleaning and Laundry Board
v. Everglades Laundry, 137 Fla. 290, 188 So. 380; Serrer v.
Cigarette Service Co., 148 Ohio 519, 76 NE 2d 91; and, Cohen
v. Frey & Sons, Inc.~ ____ MD. ____ , 80 A2d 267 to support
his assertion that the Utah statute is unconstitutional because
it purportedly fails to recognize cost differentials between the
"cost and carry" and the "credit and delivery" types of businesses. The cited cases are not in point here, however, because
in each of those cases the courts were dealing with the definition of cost to the wholesaler rather than cost to the retailer. Furthermore, in Florida Dry Cleaning and Laundry
25
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Board v. Everglades Laundry, supra, the court was dealing
with a schedule of prices fixed by a board rather than a markup
prescribed by statute. Moreover, while the Supreme Court
of Ohio made no reference to the definition of cost to the
retailer in its opinion in the Serrer v. Cigarette Service Co.
case, supra, the Court of Common Pleas (74 NE 2d 841),
affirmed by the Supreme Court of Ohio, did approve the
definition of cost to the retailer contained in the Ohio statute
when it said:

* * * * It may not be inappropriate to remark that
unlike the definition of "cost to the wholesaler" the
statutory presumptive markup does not cover a retailer's cost except in cases where the actual cost of
doing business is undeterminable or equal to 670 . In
all other cases a retailer's markup corresponds to the
actual cost ·of doing business whether it be higher or
less than the presumptive 6%.
A further distinguishing feature referred to by the court in
striking down the statute in the Cohen v. Frey & Sons, Inc.,
case, supra, was the statutory presumption of guilt which is
not present in the Utah statute. On the other hand, numerous
courts have upheld the constitutionality of such statutes where
the definition of cost contained therein was remarkably
similar to the definition of cost contained in the Utah statute.
See People v. Gordon et al., 105 Cal App 2d 711, 234 P2d 287;
People v. Pay Less Drug Stores, et al, 25 Cal 2d 108, 153
P2d 9; May's Drug Stores v. State Tax Commission, ____ Iowa
____ , 45 NW2d 245; Old Homestead Bread Co. et al v. Marx
Baking Co., 108 Colo. 375, 117 P2d 1007; State ex rel Anderson, County Attorney, v. Commercial Candy Co. Inc., et
al., 166 Kan. 432, 201 P2d 1034; Kentucky Utilities Co. v.
26
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Carlisle Ice Co., 279 Ky. 585, 131 SW 2d 499; Louisiana
Wholesaler Distributors Ass'n. v. Rosenzweig, 214 La. 1,
36 So. 2d 403; McElhone v. Geror, 207 Minn. 580, 292 NW
414; Hill et al. v. Kusy, 150 Neb. 653, 35 NW2d 594; McIntire v. Borofsky, 95 N.H. 174, 59 A2d 471; Adwon v.
Oklahoma Retail Grocers Ass'n. Inc., 204 Okla. 199, 228
P 2d 376; Rust v. Griggs, 172 Tenn. 565, 113· SW2d 733;
State v. Sears, 4 Wash. 2d 200, 103 P2d 337; State v. Twentieth
Century Markets, 236 Wis. 215, 294 NW 873; and State v.
Langley, 53 Wyo. 332, 84 P2d 767.
Appellant's assertion that if the Utah statute is construed
to prohibit only S & H cash discount stamps, it is unconstitutional because it discriminates against a legitimate business,
is another specious attempt to mislead and confuse the court.
The Utah statute does not prohibit the use of S & H cash
discount stamps. The Utah statute only prohibits -their use
for an unlawful purpose. It prohibits their issuance with
the sale of merchandise where the effect is to reduce the price
of the merchandise below cost for the purpose of injuring
competitors and destroying competition or where the effect
thereof may be substantially to lessen competition or tend
to create a monopoly. The prohibition of the statute is leveled
not only at S & H cash discounts but cash discounts in any
form when, and only when, the amount of the cash discount
reduces the selling price of the merchandise below cost in
violation of the statue. A merchant may issue cash discounts
by means of S & H green stamps or any other means so long
as the selling price of the merchandise is not thereby reduced
below cost in violation of the statute. However, he may not
do indirectly what the law prohibits him from doing directly.
27
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Designating the issuance of S & H cash discounts or any
other form of cash discounts something other than what they
actually are does not clothe the practice with judicial protection
if the practice contravenes the express provisions of a statute.
As pointed out by the New York Court of Appeals in the
case of Bristol-Meyers Co. v. Picker, et al, 302 New York 61,
96 NE2d 177:

* * * No matter how one puts it, the consumer
who is accorded a cash discount in reality pays that
much less for the article which he purchases, and this
is none the less true because the return is by way of
merchandise rat4er than coin which may purchase
merchandise. * * *
Appellant also challenges the validity of the Utah stattue
if it is construed to permit conviction upon proof in the alternative of a wrongful intent or a harmful effect. The challenged
section is Section 16A-4-7, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, as
amended by Chapter 21, Laws of 1951, which provides in
part as follows:
It shall be unlawful * * * to sell * * any article
* * * at less than the cost thereof * * * for the purpose

of injuring competitors and destroying competition,
or of misleading the public, or when the effect of selling * * * at less than cost * * * may be substantially
to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly. * * *
It is true that many statutes prohibiting sales below cost do
require -a wrongful intent to injure competitors or destroy
competition as an essential element of a violation. On the
other hand, where the language of the statute does not expressly
28
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require a wrongful intent as an essential element of the offense, courts have, by judiical construction, read that element
into the statute. Thus in Arizona v. Walgreen Drug Co., 57
Ariz. 308, 113 P2d 650, where the statute prohibited sales
below cost "with the intent or effect" of injuring competitors
or destroying competition the court said:
We consider then the objection that the chapter imposes both civil and penal liability upon one who violates its provisions without any criminal intent. Upon
a careful examination of section 3, supra, which states
what constitutes a violation of the chapter, we think
that while it is not explicitly stated therein that the
particular thing done must be done with a criminal
intent, the only reasonable implication from the entire
language of the chapter is that such intent is an essential ingredient of a violation thereof. A similar construction has been given to statutes which fail as does
ours, explicitly to require the criminal intent. People
v. Kahn, 19 Cal. App. Supp. 2d 758, 60 P.2d 596;
Omaechevarria v. Idaho, 246 U.S. 343, 38 S. Ct :323,
62 L.Ed. 763.
See also Hill et al v. Kusy,. 150 Neb. 653, 3·5 NW 2d 594;
Rust v. Griggs, 172 Tenn. 565, 113 SW 2d 733; Old Homestead Bread Co. v. Marx Baking Co., 108 Colo. 375, 117 P.
2d 1007; Acme Dstb. Co. v. Thoni, ____ Tenn. ____ 136 SW
2d 734.
In the case of Commonwealth v. Zasloff, 338 Pa. 457,
13 A. 2d 67, 128 A.L.R. 1120, the court said:

* * * if the Act confined itself to prohibiting sales
below cost when intended to destroy competition, it
would undoubtedly be valid, as has been held in various
~9
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jurisdictions where such acts have been enacted with
that qualification. State v. Central Lumber Co., 24 SD
136, 123 NW 504, 42 LRA (NS) 804, affirmed 226
U.S. 157, 33 S Ct 66, 57 L.Ed 164; People v. Kahn,
19 Cal App Supp (2d) 758, 60 P (2d) 596; Wholesale Tobacco Dealers Bureau v. National Candy &
Tobacco Co., 11 Cal (2d) 634, 82 P(2d) 3, 118
ALR 486; State v. Langley, 53 Wyo. 332, 84 P(2d)
767; Associated Merchants v. Ormesher, 107 Mont.
5}0, 86 P(2d) 1031; Rust v. Griggs, 172 Tenn. 565,
113 SW (2d) 733; Hammond v. Bayless Markets,
Inc., Arizona Superior Ct., Prentice-Hall Fed. Trade
& Ind. Serv. ( 2d ed) 96. 632. * * *
The only case cited by appellant where a statute prohibiting sales below cost was invalidated because it contained
the words "or effect" after the phrase "with intent" as does
the Utah statute is Englebrecht v. Day, 201 Okla. 585, 208
P 2d 538. In that case, certain trade practices were declared
by one section of the statute to be in contravention of the
public policy of the state and made a crime by another section
of the statute. The statute was invalidated because the court
held that to strike out any part of the section which declared
the public policy worked a change of that policy so as to
defeat the basis for declaring the prohibited trade practices a
crime. The reasoning of the court in invalidating the Oklahoma
statute would not be applicable in determining the constitutionality of the Utah statute, however, because to strike
out those words in the Utah statute would not work any change
in the declared policy of the Utah statute.
It is to be noted moreover that the Supreme Court of the
United States as well as the highest courts of various states has
upheld the constitutionality of statutes prohibiting the sell30
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ing of merchandise below a fixed price regardless of intent.
In the case of Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 78 L.Ed. 940,
54 S. Ct. 505, 89 ALR 1469, the applicable statute provided
in part as follows:

* * * it shall be unlawful for a milk dealer to sell
or buy or offer to sell or buy milk at any price less or
more than such price * * * (the price fixed by the
board). (Emphasis added.)
In upholding the validity of the statute the Supreme Court
said:
Legislation concerning sales of goods, and incidentally affecting prices, has repeatedly been held valid.
In this class fall laws forbidding unfair competition by
the charging of lower prices in one locality than those
exacted in another, by giving trade inducements to
purchasers, and by other forms of price discrimination.
The public policy with respect to free competition has
engendered state and federal statutes prohibiting
monopolies, which have been upheld.

* * * * *
* * * there can be no doubt that upon proper occasion and by appropriate measures the state may regulate
a business in any of its aspects, including the prices
to be charged for the products or commodities it sells.
In sustaining the validity of a Minnesota statute which
prohibited sales below cost "for the purpose of or with the
effect of" injuring competitors and destroying competition as
not objectionable on constitutional grounds, the Supreme Court
of Minnesota, in the case of McElhone v. Gregor, 207 Minn.
580, 292 NW 414, said:
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.,
The present statute prohibits sales at less than cost
for the purpose or with the effect of injuring competitors and destroying competition. Intent to injure
is not essential to violation. This is not fatal to the act.
Sales below cost which have the effect of injuring
competition may be prohibited regardless of intent.
(Emphasis added.)

* * * * *
The legislature is attempting to protect retailers
and the public from unfair trade practices. It is not
for us to deny its conclusions of fact that sales below
cost are harmful and constitute a trade practice so
unfair and injurious as to require legislative attention.
The act declares and implements valid policy. We
cannot say that the implementation bears no relation
to the purpose. So, whatever its interference with
plaintiff's freedom of contract, the statute transgresses
no constitutional guaranty, unless in other respects
it is arbitrary or unreasonable. The police power,
which is about all the power that sovereign government has, aside from its power of eminent domain and
taxation, is not limited to protection of public health,
morals, and safety. It extends also to "economic
needs." Veix v. Sixth Ward Bldg. & Loan Ass'n., 60
S. Ct. 792, 84 L.Ed.____ (opinion filed April 22, 1940).
Therefore, it may protect from economic harm.
The constitutionality of the Unfair Sales Act of the State
of New Hampshire making it a misdemeanor to sell below
.cost "with intent or effect of injuring competitors" was also
upheld by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire in Mcintire
v. Borofsky, 95 NH 174, 59 A2d 47. In that case the court said:

* * * Similar phraseology is found in several of
the Unfair Sales Acts of the other states. 1 Callmann,
Unfair Competition & Trade Marks ( 1945) Sec. 27,
32
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2 (a). It is well settled in this jurisdiction that the
Legislature may declare an .tct criminal without requiring that it be done with intent. State v. Cornish, 66
N.H. 329, 21 A. 180, 11 L.R.A. 191; State v. Ryan,
70 N.H. 196, 46 A. 49, 85 Am. St. Rep. 629; State v.
Goonan, 89 N.H. 528, 3 A2d 105; State v. Yosua,
91 N.H. 181, 16 A2d 370. In case of doubt the statute
has frequently been construed to require intent ( Coutremarsh v. Metcalf, 87 N.H. 127, 175 A. 173), but it is
clear that the present statute by its exp~ess terms requires either the intent or the effect of injuring or
destroying competition. The Legislature deemed it
necessary to do more than condemn a state of mind
and provided that sales below cost, except as provided
in Sec. 3, are an economic evil whether they are intended
or have the effect of injuring competition. Such a
statute is valid. McElhone v. Geror, 207 Minn. 580,
292 N.W. 414; Rust v. Griggs, 172 Tenn. 565, 113
S.W. 2d 733. Cf Corn Products Refining Co. v. Federal
Trade Commission, 324 U.S. 726, 65 S. Ct. 961, 89
L. Ed. 1320; State v. Tankar Gas, Inc., 250 Wis. 218,
26 N.W. 2d 647. (Emphasis added.)

See also Mays Drug Stores v. State Tax Commission, Iowa,
45 NW 2d 245.
Appellant also attempt to establish invalidity of the Utah
statute by comparing it with other statutes which were struck
down because in defining "cost" they were held to ~e so vague
and indefinite that the retail merchant was unable to ascertain
when he was violating the law. A careful analysis of the
statutes which were invalidated for that reason, however,
shows that those statutes were entirely different from the Utah
statute. State v. Packard Bamberger Co., 123 N.J.L. 202, 8
A2d 291; Comonwealth v. Zasloff, 338 Pa. 457, 13· A2d 67,
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128 ALR 1120; State v. Walgreen Drug Co., 57 Ariz. 308,
113 P2d 650; and, Daniel Loughran Co. v. Lord Baltimore
Candy & T. Co., 178 Md. 38, 12 A2d 201, cited by appellant,
are not in point because in each of those cases the definition
of cost was linked to such phrases as "prevailing market conditions," "existing market conditions" or the "most favorable
market prices available." None of those phrases are present
in the applicable section of the Utah statute. In the case of
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Ervin, 23 F. Supp. 70, the
court struck down a Minnesota statute because it required
a merchant making purchases from a manufacturer who published a list price to use the list price as his cost regardless
of whether or not it represented the merchant's actual cost.
There is no such arbitrary requirement in the Utah statute.
Florida Dry Cleaning and Laundry Board v. Everglades
Laundry, 13 7 Fla. 290, 188 So. 380, is not in point because
it dealt with cost to the wholesaler rather. than cost to the
retailer and also with a schedules of prices fixed by a board
rather than a statutory markup prescribed by the Legislature.
The case of Cohen v. Frey & Sons, Inc., 80 A2d (Md. 1951),
cited by appellant, cannot even be persuasive authority for
invalidating the Utah statute because in the Maryland statute
there was a presumption of guilt provision not present in the
Utah statute and also because the trial court there rejected
an attempt on the part of the defendant to establish a lesser
cost. The Utah statute expressly authorizes a lesser cost where
it can be established in lieu of the statutory markup.
Finally, appellant attempts to avoid the real issue involved
in this dispute, which is whether he violated the Utah Unfair
Practices Act, by making the assertion that the Retail Grocers'
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Association was guilty of pnce fixing m violation of the
Sherman Act.
The record shows conclusively that this was not an action
commenced by the Retail Grocers' Association but an action
commenced by the Trade Commission of Utah to enjoin the
appellant herein from violating the provisions of the Utah
Unfair Practices Act and in which action the Retail Grocers··
Association intervened upon stipulation of both parties. (Emphasis added.) Enforcement of the provisions of the Utah
Unfair Practices Act is a duty enjoined by law upon the Trade
Commission of Utah. Section 16A-2-13, Utah Code Annotated,
1943, provides:
It shall be the duty of the commission, and it shall
have full power, jurisdiction and authority:
( 1) To prescribe rules and regulations not in conflict with the constitution and laws of this state for
its own government and the transaction of its business.
(2) To have and exercise general supervision over
the administration of chapters 20 and 21, Laws of
Utah, 19J.7, as amended.
( 3) To collect, collate, and publish statistical and
other information relating to trade and business that
is material to the enforcement of this act.
( 4) To cooperate with and assist any trade or industry desiring to effectuate an agreement between its
members for the purpose of stabilizing employment
in the trade or industry and correcting unfair practices between competitors.
( 5) To have and exercise general supervision over
the administration and enforcement of Senate Bill No.
35
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42, twenty-sixth legislature of the state of Utah, known
as the barbers price and hour act.
The Unfair Practices Act of the State of Utah is Chapter 21,
Laws of Utah, 1937, as amended, referred to in subsection (2)
quoted above.
Appellant himself concedes that the Utah Unfair Practices Act is not a price fixing statute. At page 13 of his brief he
states:
Like the California Unfair Practices Act, upon which
it is modeled, the Utah Unfair Practices Act is not a
price fixing statute.
Again at page 75 he states:
In the case at bar, we think it is not only plain that
the Utah Act, like. its California prototype, was not
intended to sanction price fixing but we now have the
benefit of Schewegman Bros. v. Calvert Distillers, 341
U.S. 384, 386, 71 S. Ct. 745, 95 L.Ed. 1035, (May 21,
1951), where the Supreme Court noted that the Sherman Act makes it unlawful for individuals to enter
into any agreement, express or implied limiting or fixing prices, such price fixing being unlawful per se * * .
In citing the case of Food and Grocery Bureau v. United
States, 139 F. 2d 973, (C.C.A. 9th 1943) appellant fails to
point out that in that case the court was concerned with the
activities of an associated group which actually did attempt
to fix retail food and grocery prices, whereas in this case we
are concerned solely with an enforcement action by the Trade
Commision of Utah enjoining compliance with the Unfair
Practices Act of the State of Utah. At no time has either the
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Trade Commission of Utah or the Retail Grocers' Association
attempted to fix prices and there is no evidence in the record
to support appellant's bald assertion in this regard. The action
of the Trade Commission of Utah in enjoining compliance
with the provisions of a state statute does not in any way contravene the provisions of the Sherman Act.

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the Unfair Practices Act
of the State of Utah. is a valid exercise of the police power
of the State; that the evidence in the record supports the conclusion that appellant did violate its provision; and, that the
cited authorities support the constitutionality of the statute
so that the decree and injunction issued by the trial court
should be upheld by this Honorable Court.
Respectfully submitted,
CLINTON D. VERNON,
Attorney General
QUENTIN L. R. ALSTON
FRANOS C. LUND
Assistant Attorneys General
Attorneys for Rlaintiff and Respondent

CALVIN L. RAMPTON
SHERMAN P. LLOYD
Attorneys for Plaintiffs in Intervention and Respondents.
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